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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment

NFAC 193-81/1  
21 January 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM:

[REDACTED]  
Special Assistant for Nuclear Proliferation  
Intelligence

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SUBJECT: Nuclear Proliferation--Base Line Warning Report

1. In addition to the monthly warning reports of the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs), a periodic report (roughly, bi-monthly) covers nuclear-related activities especially concerning countries that are developing or exercising an option to acquire nuclear explosives.

2. The attached report is my summary of significant recent warning-related developments that have resulted in policy initiatives in most instances. It highlights the nuclear developments that are receiving substantial analytical and collection resources. The report has not been discussed with, or otherwise coordinated by, representatives of the intelligence agencies.

Attachment:  
Base Line Warning Report

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Base Line Warning Report: Nuclear Proliferation\* [ ]

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(NOTE: Fuller descriptive, explanatory, and predictive intelligence on the nuclear topic is produced by NFAC, or by the Intelligence Community in the form of inter-agency intelligence memoranda or National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). An example of the latter is an NIE, now in preparation, that addresses prospects for the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries over the next five years or so. This NIE, the warning reports, and other Community assessments are prepared under my aegis in consultation with the appropriate regional NIOs.)

Iraq. The Iraqis are pursuing, with [ ] assistance, a broad range of nuclear research activities. These activities, although substantially legitimate and peaceful in nature, are aimed at the eventual development of a capability to produce nuclear explosives. On a more sinister note we have recent evidence that Iraq tried to acquire illicitly some nuclear weapons usable material (plutonium metal) [ ] awareness of this effort will heighten their already marked concern over the Iraqi nuclear program and could lead to [ ] preemptive actions against the program.

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Pakistan. It is conceivable that Pakistan could produce enough plutonium for a nuclear explosive sometime in 1981 by violating international safeguards on its KANUP power reactor. We believe it more likely that it will not be able to produce enough material--either plutonium or enriched uranium--until 1982 at the earliest. Pakistan might attempt, if it hasn't already done so--to acquire material illicitly from abroad if Zia loses patience with the pace of his indigenous production program.

\*This memorandum is produced periodically by the Special Assistant to the DD/NFA for Nuclear Proliferation Intelligence. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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India. There are no signs that preparations are being made for nuclear explosive testing although the Ghandi government has made it clear that its policy is to keep this option open. Given the Indian perception that the Pakistanis are progressing toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons, at least research on nuclear weapons is likely to resume in India. The prospect of a break with the US in nuclear co-operation probably is not regarded by Indian officials as a very serious setback to Indian nuclear programs.



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Taiwan. Contingency plans for the development of nuclear weapons recently were completed and are ready for implementation if such a decision is made. Some power level Taiwanese officials

could now judge that US reactions to such a decision would not be as strong under the new Administration.

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Brazil.



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The program has a long way to go and without significant outside assistance would not lead to a weapons capability in this decade.

Argentina. Argentina is slowly freeing itself from reliance upon the US for nuclear supplies thereby enhancing not only its nuclear reputation in Latin America but also its ability to preserve an option to develop nuclear explosives. It has stoutly resisted US efforts to get Argentina to accept full-scope safeguards and has made no moves toward ratifying the Treaty of Tlateloco that establishes a Latin American nuclear weapons free zone. It reportedly will construct a domestically-fueled research reactor that would be a source of plutonium suitable for nuclear explosives.

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